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Abstract
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic
elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term
socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts
which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and
elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This
mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection
scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians’ time preferences. In
the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a
golden parachute clause.
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Long-term issues such as the European unemployment problem appear to be difﬁcult for
politicians to solve.1 In this paper we suggest that competition between politicians for
incentive contracts and elections can motivate them to undertake socially desirable long-
term projects while at the same time preserving the democratic legitimation of politicians.
We consider a model where two candidates compete for ofﬁce in an initial election period
and for subsequent reelection. Candidates are motivated by the ofﬁces they hold and
by the policies they undertake. Once a candidate is elected he can undertake socially
desirable long-term projects, opt for inefﬁcient short-term projects or stick to the status
quo. Returns from long-term projects only accrue to voters in a second election period.
The problem for the public is that the discount factor of the politician may be smaller than
that of the electorate. In such cases, the public cannot sufﬁciently motivate a politician to
invest in long-term projects, even if the public could commit itself to reelection.
To alleviate these inefﬁciencies we suggest the electorate use a hierarchy of incentive
contractsandelections. Candidatesaregiventhepossibilityofofferingincentivecontracts
when campaigning for ofﬁce for the ﬁrst election period. The incentive contract stipulates
that in the event of reelection the politician’s utility or income in the second election
period depends on policy returns such as the level of unemployment. Incentive contracts
become binding as soon as the politician decides to stand for reelection and is actually
reelected. Candidates are free to offer empty contracts or contracts making their income
depend on long-term returns.
Our ﬁndings are as follows: First, if the discount factor is below a certain threshold, the
public cannot motivate the politician to undertake long-term projects by elections alone.
This also holds if the public commits itself to a reelection scheme. The politician will
simply value the short-term beneﬁts for voters too highly. Second, when politicians can
offer incentive contracts and the public commits itself to a reelection scheme, the result is
a unique equilibrium. Both politicians offer the same contract. The equilibrium contract
stipulatesfuture transfersensuringthatthepoliticianwiththelowerdiscountfactorwill be
indifferent about choosing the long-term project or the short-term project. The politician
with the larger discount factor is elected; his prospects of reelection are sure-ﬁre and he
1 While it is apparent that there is no mechanical solution of the unemployment problem, there is a
widespread consensus that over time labor market reforms would lower unemployment in Europe con-
siderably.
2will take the socially efﬁcient long-term decision.
In the following, we relax two of the assumptions upon which the previous ﬁndings have
built. Our third result shows that the hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts will
still induce politicians to undertake socially beneﬁcial long-term projects even if the pub-
lic cannot commit itself to any future reelection behavior. We consider two reasons why
current voters may not be able to commit themselves to a certain future voting behav-
ior: the democratic requirement for unconstrained voting in every election and incentives
to reject the incumbent in order to economize on his future remunerations.2 In the for-
mer case, future transfers to an elected politician undertaking the long-term project must
be higher in equilibrium. In the second case, incentive contracts must include a golden
parachute clause guaranteeing a future bonus to a politician even he is no longer in ofﬁce.
In our fourth result we allow for the case where the public does not know the discount
factors of politicians competing for ofﬁce. In the corresponding game between politicians
and the public under asymmetric information, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in which all types of politicians will undertake the beneﬁcial long-term project. Under
uncertainty about the politician’s discount factor, the public will have to grant beneﬁts
to the politician corresponding to the beneﬁts under certainty with the lowest possible
realization of the discount factor.
To sum up, competition among politicians for the hierarchy of incentive contracts and
elections appears to be a reasonably robust mechanism for inducing socially efﬁcient
decision-making. There are, however, a number of practical issues regarding the applica-
tion of the hierarchyof incentivecontracts and elections which we will address in the ﬁnal
section. The actual reach of the dual mechanism can only be judged after these avenues
have been explored.
In this paper, we introduce competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
as a novel element in politics. While there is no further literature on competition for in-
centivecontracts by politicians, there is a rapidly growing literature on incentivecontracts
for central bankers dating back to Walsh (1995b). The government can impose a penalty
if it can verify that the central bank did not try to meet its target levels.3 In this paper, we
discuss how incentive elements can be combined with the democratic requirement of pe-
2 Thesecondreasonis lessimportantsincetheremunerationof apoliticiancreatesonlyanegligibleburden
per capita for the public.
3 For the theory of the enforcement of such arrangements and the nature of penalties see Persson and
Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995a, 1995b), Lockwood (1997) and Svensson (1997).
3riodic reelections. We suggest that competition among politicians for incentive contracts
and periodic reelection can be a solution to the democratic dilemma derivingfrom the fact
that politicians may have insufﬁcient incentives to undertake socially efﬁcient policies.
For simplicity, we consider a political economy model where politicians and voters differ
with respect to their relative valuation of future and current utilities. This is a tractable
model for the analysis of how competition for incentive contracts and elections may alle-
viate inefﬁciencies in democracies. In practice, as is discussed in the concluding section,
democracies may produce inefﬁciencies for a wide variety of reasons and it is not clear
whether the source of inefﬁciency weare focusing on isthe most important one. However,
the ideas presented in this paper may be useful when applied to other kinds of inefﬁcien-
cies in political processes.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we outline the model and our
assumptions. In section 3, we consider the potentialities and limitations of the elec-
tion mechanism for achieving optimal decisions. In section 4, we show that competition
among politicians for incentive contracts and election induces socially optimal decisions.
In section 5, we extend our analysis to the non-commitment case. In section 6, we discuss
asymmetric information. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
42 Model and Assumptions
The game we are analyzing is a dynamic game with two periods. We assume that the
politician (or agent) is risk-neutral. Returns from projects are denoted by V and will be
indexed according to the type of project and the period involved. The game is given as
follows:










￿ with the following interpretation: if politician
i gets reelected in period 2, he receives a net transfer biV2 if V2
￿ 0 and has to
pay biV2 if V2


















Stage 3: The agent must decide whether to undertake certain projects. He has three op-
tions. He can undertake a short-term policy
￿
STP
￿ generating a positive return
V1
S
￿ 0 in this period, but a negative return V2
S
￿ 0 next period. The second
option is a long-term policy
￿
LTP
￿ . For simplicity of presentation the long-term
policy is assumed to have no short-term consequences, i.e. V1
L
￿ 0. LTP gener-
ates positive payoffs V2
L
￿ 0 in the next period. The last option for the policy-
maker is to continue with the status quo and to do nothing (NOT). Payoffs in
this case areV1
N
￿ 0 and V2
N






Stage 4: The returns from the ﬁrst period are apparent. The elected politician decides
whether he wants to run for ofﬁce again. The public decides on the reelection








All costs and beneﬁts are measured in dollars. The social returns from the status quo
have been normalized to zero. There are many examples of LTP projects versus STP
or NOT projects. For instance, labor market reforms or transition processes of centrally
planned market economies towards market economies may imply no welfare improve-
ments in the short term4 but may generate beneﬁts in the long term. Other examples are
4 In some cases, short term consequences of LTP can even be negative, but this can easily be integrated
into our framework
5political business cycles where politicians adopt short-term policies instead of long-term
policies before elections thus leading to upturns before and downturns after elections,5 or
investments in infrastructure requiring a temporary cutdown on consumption but produc-
ing positive returns at a later stage.
We assume that a politician can generate private returns if he realizes social returns larger
than the returns of the status quo and as long as he is in power. The social returns from
the status quo have been normalized to zero. If he is in power and realizes a social project
returnV in a given period, we assume that his private beneﬁts are:
Ri
￿ aV (1)
where a is some number 0
￿ a
￿ 1. The above assumption is justiﬁed by the observation
that high returns enable the agent to channel some returns to interest groups that support
him, as is suggested by the large literature in public choice (see e.g. Mueller 1989).
Alternatively, the politician is genuinely concerned about the social returns he generates
in given periods. We follow the latter interpretation, which allows us to focus exclusively
on the discounting problem.6
We concentrate on the agent’s utility in period 1 when politicians stand for election for
the ﬁrst time. We assume that the utility of an agent increases both in the private beneﬁts
from holding ofﬁce, given by B
￿ 0, and from the private beneﬁts of investment projects.




























￿ aV1 and R2
i
￿ aV2 are the private returns in period 1 and 2, respectively.





￿ . The parameter m, with 0
￿ m
￿ 1, is the
signiﬁcance the agent assigns to privatereturns from projects and 1
￿ m is the signiﬁcance
of beneﬁts from holding ofﬁce. A signiﬁcance m close to 1 means that the agent is mainly
motivatedby the policies he implements. A low value for m corresponds to an agent being
mainly concerned to hold ofﬁce. The utility of outside options is assumed to be zero.
To simplify the exposition we use
5 The literature on political business cycles started with Nordhaus (1975) and Ben-Porath (1975) and was
expanded to ideological business cycles by Hibbs (1977). In Rogoff (1990), Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), Hibbs (1992), Persson and Tabellini (1993), the theory has been adapted to incorporate rational
expectations and information asymmetries.
6 The ﬁrst interpretation yields the same qualitative conclusions, but the public needs to take into account








































































































many cases such differences are known to the public. Consider for example the election
race between incumbent Kohl and challenger Schr¨ oder in 1998 in Germany. It was well-
known that Kohl was competing for a ﬁnal term whereas Schr¨ oder wanted to start his era
as chancellor. Therefore, we assume in the following that d1 and d2 are known to the
public and we label candidates such that d1
￿ d2. Later we will relax the informational
assumptions about discount factors.
We denote the expected returns from the options STP





























The preceding assumption immediately implies that in social terms the optimal policy
is LTP. To simplify the presentation, we employ three tie-breaking rules. First, if two
politicians generate the same social welfare, the public will elect the politician with the
7higher discount factor. Second, if both politicians are equally good in terms of social




2 of being elected. Third, if a politician is indifferent as to two types of
policies, he will select the one that yields higher social welfare. These tie-breaking rules
simplify the exposition but are not essential for the results.
3 Elections
In this section we discuss how the public can motivate politicians to undertake LTP if
the only available instrument is the election mechanism. We assume that the public can





￿ at STP and q
￿
0
￿ at LTP. This gives the best chance of elections inducing


























The politician cannot be motivated by elections to undertake LTP
Proof :
It is obvious that the politician will never choose NOT under any reelection scheme,
because he beneﬁts equally or more from LTP or STP. Additionally, it obvious that the









￿ 0, which is the maximum
spread to deter the politician from choosing STP. The critical discount factor is then













































￿ 0 and STP otherwise























￿ 0, we have a range for the discount factor at which politicians will not
choose the socially efﬁcient policy. Note that voters are assumed to be fully rational and
infer negative future returns from the positive returns of short-term projects in the ﬁrst
election period.7
4 Competition for the Incentive Contracts
In this section we consider the whole game and allow politicians to offer incentive con-
tracts before the ﬁrst election takes place. We still assume in this section that voters can
commit themselves to a reelection scheme in stage 1, in order to compare the competition




































































The condition ensures that the public is better off committing itself to reelection and ac-
cepting a politician withC1
￿
bV2








￿ 0 which avoids the transfer
bV2





￿ 0 because they will receive negative re-
























7 An example in which voters cannot infer the type of project the politician has undertaken in the ﬁrst
period is discussed in Gersbach (1999) without, however, considering competition of politicians for
incentive contracts.
9which gives equation (8). Since the incentive contract is irrelevant if a candidate does not


























Candidate 2 has a strict preference for LTP if elected, in contrast to the indifference as to
LTP and STP of candidate 1 if elected.
To establish equilibrium, we consider four possible deviations from the equilibrium de-
scribed in proposition 2.




￿ b. The deviation is
not proﬁtable if candidate 2 is not elected; this, in turn, is only a best response for voters
























￿ . Thus politician 2 will not be elected although he
chooses LTP because candidate 1 demands less transfer and chooses LTP in accordance
with our tie-breaking rule.




￿ b. Such a deviation is only
proﬁtable if the public ﬁnds it in its best interests to elect and reelect him. Voters want
to elect a candidate only if the candidate selects LTP once in ofﬁce. Candidate 1 would
























￿ ; thus the public will elect candidate
2 because he undertakes LTP.




￿ b. Then the public will not
elect politician 1, even if he were to undertake LTP, because for voters the payments to







￿ b, because he would receive lower transfers in the second period and in equi-
librium can be sure of being elected anyhow.














￿ or by offering an incentive contract that requires slightly fewer transfers
from the public8.
Proposition 2 shows that the hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts eliminates in-
efﬁcient decision-making in politics at the cost of future transfers to the elected politician.
Both politicians offer the same contract. The equilibrium contract stipulates future trans-
fers ensuring that the politician with the lower discount factor will be indifferent about
choosing the long-term project or the short-term project. The politician with the larger
discount factor is elected; his prospects of reelection are certain and he will take the so-
cially efﬁcient long-term decision.
In the following, we relax the assumptions upon which the result has built. In proposition
2 voters are assumed to commit themselves to a state-dependent reelection scheme. Com-
petition for incentive contracts and election can still work if the public can only commit
itself to a ﬁxed reelection probability, as is illustrated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1
Suppose the public could only commit itself to a ﬁxed reelection probability. Then the
























￿ and therefore, with incentive contracts C
￿
bV2
￿ , neither politician has an in-
centiveto adopt STP and to stand for reelection. To examine the case of non-commitment
in the next section, we denote the equilibrium value for b by b
C
. Note that b
C
in equation
(8) depends negatively on d1. A large d1 decreases the costs of transfers to the politician
and harms the elected politician 2. With appropriate modiﬁcations in the proof, proposi-
tion 2 can be extended to the case when politicians are identical:









































































5 Competition without Commitment
Theassumptionthatvoterscancommitthemselvestoareelectionschemehasmainlybeen
made in order to give the election mechanism the best chance to motivate political leaders
to invest in long-term, efﬁcient projects. However, from a strictly democratic point of
view, voters are unable to commit future citizens to adhere to a particular voting behavior.
The contracting problem is rooted in the uncertainty about future electoral interests and
the liberal principle of democracies to allow for free and anonymous voting behavior in
elections.
The impossibility of commitment to future voting behavior represents another source of
inefﬁciency outlined in Glazer (1989), Gersbach (1993) and Besley and Coate (1998)
and in related work by Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and
Persson and Svensson (1989). We can easily integrate the impossibility of commitment
into ourmodel. There aretwo non-commitmentproblems: incentivesof votersto rejectan
incumbentsoastoeconomizeonhisfutureremunerationsandthedemocraticrequirement
for unconstrained voting in every election. We deal with the latter case ﬁrst. Suppose
there is complete uncertainty about the voting behavior of future generations such that an
electedpoliticiantoday has an apriori expectation of reelection of qi
￿ 1
2 independently of
his actions in the past. This is an opposite pole to the commitment case where qi is either
1 if the choice of LTP is expected or 0 otherwise. Though we think that intermediate
cases are the most plausible, it is instructive to compare these polar opposites. For the












































































The proof is analogous to the commitment case. The only difference is that the utility in
the second period must be evaluated with q1
￿ q2
￿ 1








It is obvious that under non-commitment it requires a higher future transfer to make the
politician with the lower discount factor indifferent as to LTP and STP. The impossibility
of the present generation of voters to commit future voters to a particular election choice
entails the larger transfer a reelected politician must receive if he undertakes LTP.
There might be a second and even more extreme case of non-commitment if voters at the
reelection date deﬁnitely reject the incumbent, in order to economize on future remuner-
ations for the politician. In this case the nature of the incentive contracts can be amended
in the following way. The incentive contract becomes effective if the politician stands for
reelection, independently of whether he is reelected. Thus, he can receive future beneﬁts
from LTP even if he is not in ofﬁce anymore. We call such incentive contracts golden
parachute contracts; they are denoted by CPa. The utility for a politician if he is not
reelected is denoted byU
para






















￿ and politicians can offer golden parachute contracts and
the politician elected in period 1 is rejected with certainty. There then exists a unique




















































￿ because a politician is not forced to offer a parachute con-
tract. While we have assumed an extreme case of non-commitment in proposition 4, it
is obvious that the option to offer golden parachute contracts also works for intermediate
values of reelection probability when standard contracts cannot induce LTP with lower
costs for the public.
6 Asymmetric Information
While politicians’ discount factors may be well-known in some circumstances, there may
be more uncertainty in other cases. For instance, when two politicians are competing for
ofﬁceforthe ﬁrsttime, thepublic maybe uncertainaboutthepreferencesofthe politicians
and in particular about discount factors. To explore how asymmetric information affects
the functioning of the dual mechanism - incentive contracts and elections - we assume
that the public knows that both politicians competing for ofﬁce have discount factors dH
with probability w and dL
￿ dH with probability 1
￿ w. We assume that politicians know





￿ to denote the beliefs of







￿ have been offered. Then we look for perfect Bayesian equilibria in the election
and the incentive contract game. We obtain:
9 The assumption appears to be plausible because of the superior knowledge politicians have about each
other through their daily interaction. However, the equilibrium also exists in the case of asymmetric
information of politicians about each other’s discount factor.
14Proposition 5



























































































































































































































We ﬁrst observe that for bi
￿ b
AI
both types of politicians choose LTP independently of
whether they have high or low discount factors. Thus, in equilibrium politicians choose


















would result in zero probability of election.
Equilibrium beliefs obey Bayes’ law. Finally, we have to check the election strategy of
voters. Equilibrium election and reelection strategies are optimal since both politicians





different from the equilibrium strategies. Since they do not change their a priori beliefs,





Both politicians, if elected, would choose LTP independently of their discount fac-





The ﬁrst politician will choose LTP independently of his type and will thus be






The politician with a high discount factor will choose LTP and the other one STP.
But the public does not know which politician will undertake LTP. So politician 1




Independently of type neither politician will choose LTP. Thus, the public will
elect the ﬁrst politician, who offers a lower transfer bV2.
￿ b1
￿ b2
Since the politicians offer the same contract and they are homogeneous, both have
equal probability of being elected.
￿ In all other cases the utility associated with the election of the second candidate is
always higher for the voters.
16Proposition 5 shows that the hierarchy of incentive contracts and elections also works
under incomplete information. But b
AI
is evaluated at the lower discount factor and thus
the public is forced to accept transfers to the politician higher than those expected when
















Our simple analysis suggest that the dual mechanism of competition for elections and
incentive contracts might alleviate some of the inefﬁciencies in democratic decision-
making. However, there are many issues still waiting to be be examined before the dual
mechanism could be proposed for democracies on a solid theoretical basis.
A critical issue for the application of incentive contracts and elections is the multi-task
problem politicians usually face. Politicians in the executive and legislative branch deal
with many different issues. Moreover, other issues, such as reforming health care, can-
not be measured with any major precision in performance terms. The problem of how
multi-task activities and measurement problems can be integrated into the hierarchy of
incentive contracts and elections will need to be explored in future research (see Gers-
bach and Liessem 2000). There are a number of further practical issues, for instance the
quantitative measures that should be used for the incentive contract. In the case of Euro-
pean unemployment this is relatively obvious, because the incentive contract can use the
average unemployment rate. But there can be a deﬁnition problem here given that the un-
employment rate is deﬁned in many different ways. Hence there is a need to agree upon a
deﬁnition that is not susceptible of change or manipulation. Also, enforcing the incentive
contract will require a special court which could be a separate entity of the constitutional
court.
Finally, the literature has identiﬁed a number of further important inefﬁciencies in the
political system (see Mueller (1989), Dixit (1998), Stiglitz (1989), Persson and Tabellini
(1990),Campbell1999Leblanc, SnyderandTripathi(2000),GersbachandHaller(2000)).
How the dual mechanism can be applied for these kinds of inefﬁciencies and for more
sophisticated political-economic models might be a useful extension. An even more chal-
lenging task would be the use of incentivecontracts when policies are determined through
17a combination of decisions at the federal and the local level. For instance, in the new
framework introduced by Cr´ emer and Palfrey (2000), the federal level can constrain local
policy by mandating a minimum policy. In this framework, voters choose federal man-
dates that are too strict. Whether supplementing this two-tier government by incentive
contracts at the federal or local level would lead to more efﬁcient provision of public
goods is an open question. The actual reach of the dual mechanism can only be judged
after these avenues have been explored.
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